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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. In 1985 and 1986, the Court of Auditors carried out a 
general survey based on a questionnaire sent to the 45 
Commission delegations which were responsible, for 50 
recipient countries, for food aid intended for sale, in order 
to find out how these countries managed the counterpart 
funds generated by such sales. An analysis of the replies 
received shows that the main problems relate to the 
opening and financing of the counterpart accounts and the 
utilization and monitoring of the funds deposited in them. 
The first part of this report analyses these various aspects of 
the management of counterpart funds. The Court has also 
taken care to check these same factors directly, in Niger, 
Burkina Faso and Egypt. The results of these on-the-spot 
findings are set out in the second part of the report. They 
constitute a specific illustration of the findings of the 
general survey. 
The objectives and mechanism of counterpart 
funds 
1.2. When counterpart funds are implemented, they are a 
vital factor in the management of Community food aid. 
Such aid complies with principles which, at the time of the 
Court's survey, were set out in Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 3331/82 of 3 December 1982 (
l). Counterpart funds 
must comply primarily with two of the objectives 
prescribed by this legislation: 
(a) first objective: 
food aid must 'contribute towards the balanced economic 
and social development of the recipient countries' (Article 2 
(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3331/82 (*)); 
(b) second objective: 
Article 2 (3) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3331/82 also 
states that: 'The granting of food aid shall, if necessary, be 
conditional on the implementation of annual or multi-
annual development projects, priority being given to 
projects which promote the production of food in the 
recipient countries. Where appropriate, the aid may 
contribute directly to the implementation of such projects. 
This complementarity may be ensured through the use of 
counterpart funds where the products suppled by the 
Community as aid are intended for sale.' 
(!) The footnotes appear together at the end of the report. 
1.3. Regulation No 3331/82 (*) clearly contained lacunae 
and ambiguities. On 22 December 1986, the Council 
adopted a new regulation to replace it, namely Regulation 
(EEC) No 3972/86 (
2). This regulation considerably 
clarifies the Community's policy on this question. It 
stipulated in particular (Article 2 (2)) that 'where (this aid 
is) sold, the price thereof must not be one liable to disrupt 
the domestic market'. It also lays down (Article 2 (5)) that, 
when the granting of food aid is conditional on the 
implementation of development projects or programmes, 
'this complementarity shall be ensured through the use, laid 
down by common agreement, of counterpart funds where 
the products supplied by the Community as aid are 
intended for sale'. 
1.4. However, right from the beginning of the period 
covered by Regulation No 3331/82 (
l) (which is also the 
period covered by this report), the Commission concluded 
delivery agreements on a case-by-case basis with the 
recipient countries, the detailed provisions of which 
foreshadowed those of Regulation No 3972/86 (
2). The 
standardized text of these provisions was reproduced, 
thoughout the period 1982-86, from one agreement to the 
next and for all the recipient countries. Apart from a very 
small number of exceptions, each delivery agreement lays 
down that: 
(a) the beneficiary shall open a special account with his 
central bank, in order to credit to it the proceeds of the 
sale of the food aid received; 
(b) the price at which the product supplied was sold on the 
market must serve as a reference for the purpose of 
crediting the account; 
(c) the funds credited in this way must be allocated to the 
financing of one or more development projects 
according to procedures which should be worked out 
between the recipient country and the Community and 
which should, in any event, according to Regulation 
No 3331/82 aim, as a matter of priority, to promote 
food production in the recipient countries. 
1.5. The Court carried out its investigations with 
reference to the legal basis provided by the terms of the 
delivery agreements, drawn up by contract between the 
Commission and the recipient countries. Its first objective 
was to find out to what extent the agreements concluded 
had or had not been observed and to assess the seriousness 
of the infringements. Its second objective was to examine, 
in the light of these infringements and the context in which 
they had occurred, whether some of the provisions of the 
delivery agreements should be amended, with a view to 
simplifying them, or in some cases, on the contrary, filling 
in loopholes. No C 31/20 Official Journal of the European Communities 4. 2. 88 
2. THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEY BY 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Opening the counterpart account 
2.1. The principle of a single account opened at the 
central bank of the recipient country has only partly been 
observed. The discrepancies in relation to the conditions 
laid down concern the following points: 
(a) recourse to a financial institution other than the central 
bank; 
(b) the opening of multiple accounts; 
(c) the amalgamation of resources generated by Com-
munity aid with those provided by other donors. 
A total of more than two-thirds of the accounts examined 
during the survey did not fully comply with the require-
ments laid down in the delivery agreement. This is hardly 
surprising, as it may prove to be difficult — if not 
impossible — to observe the provisions laid down. 
2.2. As regards the question of the central bank, a 
problem arises if this institution is not of an appropriate 
kind, or if it functions as the central bank of several 
different countries. Delivery agreements drawn up ac-
cording to a standardized model do not allow for any 
adaptations to suit local circumstances, although it is 
sometimes appropriate to entrust the management of the 
funds to other types of financial institution, including even 
commercial banks. Altogether, counterpart fund accounts 
have been opened with institutions other than the central 
bank in 17 countries. 
2.3. The opening of multiple accounts was noted in 13 
countries. This multiplicity often results from purely 
chance circumstances: 
(a) after several unsuccessful attempts, it was at last 
possible to implement a real counterpart funds system, 
thanks to the opening of additional accounts (see the 
case of Burkina Faso, paragraph 3.8 below); 
(b) the idea has at times gained ground that opening a 
special account to collect the proceeds of the sale of 
each branch of Community aid or to enable projects to 
be financed individually would allow the operation of 
the account to be monitored more easily. In practice, 
the reverse is true: multiplicity of accounts complicates 
administration and does not facilitate controls. 
2.4. In about 10 recipient States, one and the same 
account lumps together the proceeds of sales of aid from 
various Community and non-Community sources. In such 
cases, the possibility of monitoring counterpart funds is 
broadly dependent on the existence of subsidiary accounts 
or the keeping of supplementary accounts specifically for 
Community aid. It is only possible to accept a joint account 
for all donors in quite exceptional cases, such as that of 
Mali, where international aid is subject to coordinated 
management. 
2.5. In most cases, the opening of irregular accounts 
seriously disturbs not only the monitoring, but also the 
actual operation, of the system. For this reason, in cases 
where draconian steps taken by the delegations have 
enabled accounts to be opened or brought into line with the 
legislation, the improvements achieved have gone beyond 
simply regularizing matters from the formal point of view. 
It is possible to envisage the funds being utilized and 
monitored under far better conditions. However, the 
survey carried out shows that the counterpart account was 
established in accordance with the delivery agreement in 
about 15 countries at the most. 
Observation 
2.6. Such a situation compels the Commission, on the one 
hand, to revise the 'standard' text of the delivery 
agreements and, on the other hand, to attempt to adapt it to 
the specific realities of each recipient country. In this 
connection, it is clear that recourse to private financial 
institutions would sometimes eliminate a number of 
problems, by removing any temptation to confuse the 
counterpart funds with those belonging to the State budget, 
and by simplifying the monitoring of the operation of the 
accounts, on both the credit and debit sides. 
Financing the counterpart account 
2.7. In its examination of the financing and operation of 
the counterpart funds, the Court came up against the first 
major obstacle. Nowhere in the Commission files is there 
an overall summary of all the revenue generated in the 
recipient States by the sale of food aid. This observation 
applies in particular to the use of resources generated in this 
way and to the balance of the funds remaining available on 
the accounts as a whole. All that is available is piecemeal 
information, which is not always up-to-date, in certain of 
the Commission's files. 
2.8. According to section 2 of Annex I to the delivery 
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it is normally the price at which the product supplied was 
sold on the market that should serve asareference for the 
purpose of crediting the account.Lhestageto betaken into 
consideration^wholesale or retail^is not specified. Prom 
the results of the surveyor is not possible to draw up an 
exhaustive tableofthe amounts that would result from the 
strict application of the delivery agreements in all the 
countries concerned, but the survey reveals serious and 
similar shortcomingsmthe implementation of the system. 
2.^. (On accountoflosses occurring during marketing and 
transport within the country ^n addition to shipping 
losses^, the quantity acknowledged as having been sold— 
and therefore the amount tobepaidmtothe fund — is 
reduced.Lhe Court is unable to estimate the total extent of 
the resulting shortfall. Idowever, through concrete ex 
amples observed during onthespot visits,the Court was 
able to establish the frequency of such losses which, 
cumulatively,may exceede^^of the initial consignments. 
2.10. ^ome aid did not generate anycounterpart funds, 
on account ofthe conditions under which itwas granted by 
the Community, recipient countries cannot be asl^ed to sell 
aid products that are of very poor quality ^see paragraphs 
^and^llbelowP 
2.11. height countries the Court noted that, contrary to 
the terms of the delivery agreements, the aid had not been 
paid for m money, ^n Angola and Mauritania, the 
Community was faced witha^M^^o^^B. in the other 
countries, the delegation acceded to requests from the local 
authorities, The actual situation of theeconomy ofthe 
recipient country in cases hl^e this maizes it difficult to 
distinguishaprion between situations where aid could be 
paid for and those where it could not.There isagrey area 
where the tendency to increase the proportion of aid 
distributed free of charge or at very low prices cannot be 
prevented, mainly on account ofthe inadequacy ofthe 
purchasing power of the populations concerned. 
2.12. Even when the aid is sold, the amounts credited do 
not always correspond to thepnce that would actually 
result from selling it at genuinely marl^etclearmg prices, 
and the consequence is usuallyareductionmthe amounts 
creditedto the special account. Lnfact, in a number of 
countries, prices are fixed administratively and^or without 
real reference to the local market. These sales made at 
artificially low prices discourage local producers and help 
to exclude them from economic and social hfe. 
2.P3. hus not always possible to obtamamarl^et price for 
a particular product, either because the product is not 
produced locally,or because it is difficult to calculate the 
value of it objectively, ^n such cases the Commission agrees 
to tal^eadifferent basis ofreference^usually the ca.f.value 
of the product on the world marl^etP The delivery 
agreements, however, say nothing on this point and should 
therefore be revised accordingly.Asubstitute price is used 
in one quarter of all cases. The Commission should 
examine the use of this approach country by countryand 
product by product and should l^eepaclose watch on the 
values used.Porexample,the choice of an f.o.b. Europe 
value means that the maritime freight cost, at theca.f. 
value,is deducted^^^o from the proceeds. 
2.14. The delivery agreements state that the proceeds of 
the sale are to be paid into the counterpart fund account. 
They also provide that the beneficiary country is to inform 
the Commission of the normal marketing costs. Provisions 
of this l^md do not give authorisation for the related costs 
ofmantimetransport,mthe case of aid granted atthe f.o.b. 
stage, or of transport withm the country,or of marketing, 
bethey realor notional, to bedeductedfromthegross 
revenue received, ^till less do they stipulate what expenses, 
if any, are eligible for deduction. The Commissions 
interpretation of delivery agreements is too favourable to 
beneficiary countries, in that it does not disallow deduction 
of marketing costs,where this is practised, and does not 
encouragedelegations to tal^eaction wheresuch deduc 
tions are made. 
2.1^. in seven countries customs duties in respect of food 
aid operations are included in the selling price and the 
corresponding amounts are not paid into the special 
account.There are two different elements to be criticised 
here^ 
^ firstly,theCommissionmustensurethatbeneficiary 
states do not levy Customs duties on gifts which they 
receive fromthe Community^ 
^ nevertheless, if in cases of this l^ind the sales price of 
goods is set atalevel equivalent to the import value 
plus the value ofthe customs duties for equivalent 
products, in order not to disrupt the local market, this 
ought notto result in thecreation of an additional 
resource for the budget of the beneficiary ^tate^ 
instead, an amount corresponding to the customs duty 
should alsobecreditedtothe counterpart account. 
2.1^. Pinally, sums which are acknowledged to be 
payable to the counterpart account are sometimes not in 
fact paid into it.Thesum is then acknowledged to beowing 
tothe account. 
C^^B^o^ 
2.1^. In all cases the^salespricemn calculating counters 
part funds should be at least equivalent to the ca.f. price of 
the productvalued at the price ruling on the world market, 
but should also be set atalevel which does not disrupt local 
production. The deductions that may be made should be 
harmonised between countries and should be fully and 
accuratelydefmedinthe delivery agreements.The aim is 
therefore to arrive atasystem for setting prices which will 
be clear,simple and verifiable and will ensure thatthereisa 
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after deduction of marketing-related charges and the 
amount to be paid into the special account. The method of 
calculating the amount which the country undertakes to 
pay into the counterpart fund should therefore be agreed in 
advance between the Commission and the beneficiary 
State. 
The use of counterpart funds 
2.18. The funds entered as revenue in the counterpart 
accounts must be used by the recipients of food aid. In the 
delivery agreement, the recipients undertake to use these 
funds solely for development projects or programmes, 
preferably in the rural sector or the agri-foodstuffs sector. 
The delivery agreements make no mention of the procedure 
according to which decisions on the financing of projects or 
programmes are to be made. In a number of cases, 
particularly those of Egypt and Peru, the Commission 
shows a tendency to place the funds under joint manage-
ment, most often by making their release conditional on the 
signature of the Commission's delegate, in addition to that 
of a representative of the recipient State. 
2.19. This joint management has some advantages. 
Nevertheless, the Court does not recommend amending the 
text of the delivery agreements so as to make such a 
provision generally applicable. Indeed, disregarding any 
political problems, the use of two signatures or any 
procedure of the same type incurs the risk — which cannot 
be underestimated — of slowing down the financing 
operations for development projects or programmes. 
2.20. Up to now, the main problem has in fact been how 
to make rapid use of the funds which ultimately become 
available and allocate them to finance projects which will 
help to improve the food situation in the country. In those 
beneficiary countries in which the funds have been 
correctly constituted, they are used too slowly, or even not 
at all. 
2.21. According to Regulation No 3331/82, the funds 
should be allocated, as a priority, so as to finance 
development projects aiming to promote food production 
and in 75 % of the countries covered by the inquiry, the 
counterpart funds were indeed used for projects in the agri-
foodstuffs sector and did actually make a contribution to 
national development. However, the delivery agreements 
do not generally lay down any very precise obligations, 
since they refer to 'development projects' to be im-
plemented 'according to procedures to be established 
between the country receiving the aid and the Community'. 
Whatever reasons may have led the Commission and the 
recipient States to extend the field of operations financed by 
the counterpart funds, there is an excessive lack of precision 
in the whole of this legislation. 
2.22. As a result, the funds were used to provide 
emergency aid to the indigent and to the victims of drought, 
to defray the cost of transporting aid within the recipient 
country and to finance technical assistance with a view to 
creating and running a food strategy coordination unit in 
one recipient country. 
2.23. Funds are also increasingly used directly by 
agricultural intervention organizations, generally public 
ones: 
(a) the funds paid over are often used to cover overheads or 
trading deficits, or to provide starting capital when 
they are set up; 
(b) these intervention agencies are often used to subsidize 
consumer prices. One of them pointed out that produce 
was resold at a price below the cost price to the State; 
(c) moreover, they do not receive appropriate budgetary 
resources for the responsibilities assigned to them 
when, for example, they are instructed to distribute aid 
which is not intended for sale; 
(d) these organizations have used funds in the form of 
working capital to finance seasonal purchases, on the 
pretext that they did not have appropriate liquid 
resources. This implied that the deficiency would be 
made good after the products thus acquired had been 
sold. In some cases, however, the authorities had them 
distributed free of charge and on this occasion, 
contrary to expectations, the sums disbursed were not 
made good. 
Observation 
2.24. The Court must draw the Commission's attention 
to the problems of control posed by the operations 
described above. Counterpart funds are supposed to 
contribute towards increasing agricultural production in 
countries which are suffering food shortages; this aim is 
mainly achieved by financing investments in the field of 
agricultural production. From a financial point of view, the 
funds should be used so as to give practical expression to 
the principle which has been emphasized by the Com-
munity budgetary authorities on may occasions, namely 4. 2. 88  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 31/23 
that, far from helping to undermine local agricultural 
systems, food aid must make it possible to strengthen them 
and gradually render external food aid unnecessary. It is 
important to ensure, therefore, that food aid resources are 
correctly marshalled and then used to contribute to the 
realization of this objective of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs. 
With regard more particularly to the financing of 
intervention agencies, there are major practical reasons for 
proceeding with extreme caution, since it is particularly 
difficult to monitor this type of financing and its adverse 
effects on the agricultural sector are always to be feared. 
Reliable management of a central intervention agency is 
something which is not within easy reach of the States 
concerned, as successive audits carried out in these agencies 
have shown. 
Monitoring of counterpart funds 
2.25. Under the delivery agreements, the recipient States 
are required to provide the Commission with quarterly 
reports on the quantities sold and annual reports on the 
operation of the counterpart account. The Court noted 
that, with very rare exceptions, these reports were never 
filed by the recipient States. The information which the 
Commission has at its disposal on the quantities sold and 
the operation of counterpart accounts is nevertheless quite 
considerable. However, it is obtained by the delegations, in 
a patchy and incomplete manner, after repeated requests, 
and too long after the deliveries have been made. 
Observation 
2.26. The Court suggests that the provisions of the 
delivery agreements relating to the filing of quarterly and 
annual reports should be relaxed, so as to bring them more 
realistically into line with the administrative capabilities of 
many of the recipient countries. The main thing is not to get 
them to write reports, but to insist that they keep accurate 
and up-to-date accounts, showing, on the revenue side, the 
value in local currency of each delivery and, on the 
expenditure side, the cost of each development project 
financed. It is also essential that, once these accounts have 
been drawn up with the utmost accuracy, they should be 
accessible to an official in each delegation who would be 
responsible for monitoring them constantly. This is, 
moreover, the course of action which a number of 
delegations are automatically tending to follow. Once the 
terms of the delivery agreements have been amended, 
precise instructions — which is what the delegations have 
so far lacked — should be issued with this objective in 
mind. 
3. EXAMINATION OF COUNTERPART 
ACCOUNTS IN NIGER, 
BURKINA FASO AND EGYPT 
Niger 
Opening the counterpart account 
3.1. In Niger the funds are deposited in a single account 
opened with the Development Bank of the Republic of 
Niger (DBRN), whereas the agreements, drafted in the 
usual terms, implied that the funds should be paid to the 
central bank, in this case, the Central Bank of the States of 
West Africa (CBSWA), an interstate bank. No doubt it was 
preferable to use a purely Niger financial institution. 
Appropriate specific provisions should, however, have 
been included in the delivery agreement. 
Financing the counterpart account 
3.2. The total value of the 'for sale' aid received by Niger 
since 1981 is in the region of 3 500 Mio CFA.F (± 10,2 Mio 
ECU) (average value at the world market price). The 
delegation calculates that the actual proceeds of the sales 
amounts to 1 554,62 Mio CFA.F (± 4,5 Mio ECU). The 
Niger authorities, for their part, appear to estimate this 
amount at 1 473,36 Mio CFA.F (± 4,3 Mio ECU). They 
have, however, only credited the account with 693,3 Mio 
CFA.F (± 2,0 Mio ECU). The difference between the value 
of the aid and the amount credited to the account is almost 
3 000 Mio CFA.F (± 8,7 Mio ECU). There are various 
reasons for this difference, as may be seen below. 
3.3. An amount of 2 200 Mio CFA.F (± 6,4 Mio ECU) 
may be accounted for in terms of losses in respect of the 
quantities supplied, the poor quality of the deliveries (in 
particular, in the case of one sub-standard delivery of 
25 000 t of cereals representing ± 3,7 Mio ECU), a price 
which was particularly low, or reduced to zero (free 
distributions authorized by the Commission) and various 
deductions. A flat-rate deduction for costs of 30 CFA.F/kg 
was granted in respect of all products delivered, irrespective 
of the value of the product. It is reasonable to ask whether, 
in this specific case, the costs involved were normal 
marketing costs, since there was no justification for the 
level of the deduction made. The level of the flat-rate 
deduction in the case of maize (- 30 %) was too high and 
greatly reduced the amount credited. It is by no means 
negligible for the products of a higher unit value (11 % for 
skimmed-milk powder and 16 % for rice). And, in any 
event, such deductions are not stipulated in the delivery 
agreements. 
3.4. The delegation considered that a supplementary 
amount totalling 81 Mio CFA.F (± 0,2 Mio ECU) was still 
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it had not attempted to explain the causes of the difference, 
which may just as easily lie with the prevailing prices as 
with the quantities offered for sale. 
3.5. The OFPN acknowledges that it still has to pay into 
the account an amount totalling 780 Mio CFA.F (± 
2,3 Mio ECU). 
The use of counterpart funds 
3.6. In July 1985 payments totalling 677,4 Mio CFA.F 
(± 1,97 Mio ECU) were made to Niger from the 
counterpart fund. Outstanding commitments amounted to 
15,9 Mio CFA.F (± 0,05 Mio ECU). All of these financing 
operations related to agricultural development projects, in 
accordance with the terms of the delivery agreement. 
3.7. The Commission entered into negotiations with the 
Niger authorities to examine how to use the remaining 
counterpart funds of 1 554 Mio CFA.F (± 4,5 Mio ECU) 
resulting from the sale of Community food aid. This 
actually involved 861 Mio CFA.F (± 2,5 Mio ECU) in 
claims not paid into the account, of which 780 Mio CFA.F 
were acknowledged as being owed by the Niger authorities. 
The option of incorporating them into the OFPN's capital 
in order to strengthen its financial structure was envisaged. 
In reality, everything suggests that this was purely an 
accounting trick, designed to cover former deficits or the 
OFPN's operating expenses, without any guarantee being 
given in respect of the restructuring of the Niger cereals 
markets, which is, however, necessary. 
Burkina Faso 
Opening the counterpart account 
3.8. At least three special accounts were opened success-
ively. A first account, opened at the Treasury, did not 
comply with the legislation and has never operated 
correctly. A second account with the CBSWA, which has 
already been mentioned, has practically never been used, 
since the proceeds of only one single sale have been paid 
into it. The amount thus credited in April 1984 was 
transferred in May 1985 to a third account which had been 
opened since July 1984 at the International Bank for Trade, 
Industry and Agriculture (IBTIA). The balance of the 
account opened at the Treasury should also have been 
transferred to this financial institution, but in fact this was 
not done. 
3.9. The opening of a single bank account for the 
counterpart funds obtained from the sale of Community 
aid products presupposes that the types of aid do not differ 
too greatly. The movements of funds relating to normal 
food aid (Regulation (EEC) No 3331/82 0)) and the 
repayments effected within the framework of the special 
programme for the fight against famine in the world were 
made from and to the same account. However, monitoring 
each of these two types of aid involved completely different 
requirements. In the case of normal food aid, the important 
thing is to ensure that the funds credited are in line with the 
provisions of the delivery agreement and that they have 
been used quickly and properly. In the case of the special 
programme, the important thing is that the initial subsidy 
has been made good which is difficult to monitor if one and 
the same account is used. The accounting procedure 
adopted should take account of this requirement. 
3.10. The use of a private bank, such as the IBTIA, does 
not comply with delivery standards either. It does have two 
advantages, however: the funds are managed normally, 
whereas the precarious situation of the Treasury of Burkina 
Faso might otherwise result in delays in the flow of funds, 
and the IBTIA, unlike the Treasury and the CBSWA, pays 
interest on unused funds. 
Financing the counterpart account 
3.11. The sales prices applied to calculate the funds 
appear to be acceptable, which means that the amounts in 
the account, representing 2 553 Mio CFA.F (± 7,0 Mio 
ECU) since 1976 must themselves be recognized as 
acceptable. Some difficulties have been encountered, 
however: 
(a) the quality of a delivery of 8 0001 of maize made under 
the 1985 programme was questioned. Its value appears 
to have been in the region of 500 Mio CFA.F (± 
1,5 Mio ECU), which were not credited to the account; 
(b) as at 31 December 1984, the intervention agencies had 
not paid an amount of 1 337,3 Mio CFA.F (± 3,9 Mio 
ECU) into the special account. On 15 September 1985 
this amount was reduced to 159 Mio CFA.F (± 
0,5 Mio ECU) owed by the National Office for Cereals 
(NAOFCER) (88 Mio CFA.F /± 0,3 Mio ECU/ under 
the 1982/1984 programmes and 71 Mio CFA.F l± 
0,2 Mio ECU/ under the 1985 programme. 
The use of counterpart funds 
3.12. At the end of 1985, 700 Mio CFA.F (± 2,0 Mio 
ECU) were repaid to the NAOFCER with a view to 
purchasing local cereals. In March 1986, Burkina Faso 
requested the allocation of a further 500 Mio CFA.F (± 
1,5 Mio ECU) for the purchase of local cereals. A measure 
to replace 1,54 Mio ECU decided on at the beginning of 
1986 has a similar object. All of this, and in particular the 
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ECU), may be seen as a disguised form of support for the 
NAOFCER, and the amount corresponds to the debt of 
1 178 Mio ECU settled by the NAOFCER between the end 
of 1984 and the end of 1985. 
3.13. Moreover, 669 Mio ECU were devoted to develop-
ment projects, but there is a considerable balance of 
5,25 Mio CFA.F (± 1,5 Mio ECU) which could be put to 
other uses than the payment of subsidies to NAOFCER, as 
referred to under paragraph 3.12. In particular, the text of 
the delivery agreements, which refers to development 
projects, should make it possible, where economically 
profitable, to finance investments in the industrial or 
transport sectors, especially if such investments indirectly 
benefit agriculture. Thus, the Court visited a project 
concerning the repairing of unmetalled tracks linking 
Aribinda to Dori via Gorom-Gorom, at a cost of 78 Mio 
CFA.F (± 227 000 ECU), which were carried out in 
1984/85. During the 1984/85 rainy season, the tracks in 
question, in particular those between Dori and Gorom-
Gorom, were badly damaged once again. Considering the 
importance of this link with the North, the funds would 
have been more sensibly used had they once again been 
used for repairing these tracks. 
Egypt 
Opening the counterpart account 
3.14. A single account has been opened at the central 
bank. It is an account financed by the Ministry of Supply 
and kept by the Ministry of Finance. This account receives 
the proceeds of the sale of the food aid received by this 
country, without any distinction being made between the 
donors. 
3.15. One cannot fail to note the very long periods of time 
which elapse between the arrival of the Community food 
aid, its sale on the market, normally in the following three 
months, since Egypt has an average storage capacity of 
three months, and the period when the funds are actually 
credited to the account. Up to January 1986, almost none of 
the amounts corresponding to the deliveries made under 
the 1983,1984 and 1985 programmes had been credited to 
the account. The funds corresponding to the 1983 and 1984 
programmes were credited at the beginning of January 
1986. 
Financing the counterpart account 
3.16. The value of the food aid delivered from 1978 (the 
first year in which counterpart refunds were instituted in 
Egypt) until the 1985 programme amounts to some 
235,8 Mio ECU (average value at world market prices), 
about 189,3 Mio £E (at the March 1986 exchange rate: 1 
ECU = 0,802 £E). The net sale value recognized by the 
Egyptian authorities for this food aid, after deductions, is 
about 63 Mio £E (± 78,6 Mio ECU), i.e. one third of the 
initial value of the goods. The amounts that have actually 
been credited to the counterpart fund account are about 
50,5 Mio £E (± 63 Mio ECU). The amounts received were 
smaller mainly because of the lengthy payment periods 
mentioned previously, but also because of unexplained 
differences between the values used and the amount of the 
transfers that were made. Apart from the low return, which 
resulted from anomalies in the payment of funds into the 
account, above all it was the low prices charged and the 
proportionally high transport and distribution costs which 
were responsible for such a large reduction in the 
counterpart fund receipts. On the other hand, no 
appreciable loss in value was noted due to damage or the 
requirement to distribute the goods received free of charge. 
The use of counterpart funds 
3.17. It was only very recently that funds actually started 
to be paid on a more regular basis into the counterpart 
account. The information supplied by the Egyptian 
authorities in this respect is so vague that at the present time 
it is impossible to break down the data entered under the 
debit items of the account into intended expenditure, 
expenditure agreed in principle, expenditure actually 
committed by the signing of the contracts or other similar 
commitments and expenditure which has been incurred 
and has resulted in payment. In fact, it would appear that, 
up to now, none of the projects listed as due to be financed 
from the counterpart funds has actually resulted in a 
payment being made, in other words, in the actual 
disbursement of funds by an Egyptian authority, for the 
benefit of a contractor or a person providing a service, after 
a service has been provided. In 91 % of cases, the recorded 
'use' of counterpart funds appears to be just intended 
expenditure, whereas the expenditure which has actually 
been incurred and resulted in payments is of the order of 
18,6 Mio £E (± 23,2 Mio ECU), i.e. 37 % of the available 
funds and, more significantly, 10 % of the initial value of 
the food aid. The debits recorded in the counterpart 
account appear to be mere book entries transferred 
between the different budget headings of the Egyptian 
ministries. 
Supervision of the counterpart account 
3.18. The information which the delegation has at its 
disposal is particularly inadequate. This may partly be 
explained by the complexity of the national administration 
system, since four ministries are involved in aid manage-
ment, and this has led to a failure on the part of the 
authorities to honour their obligations. They have not 
forwarded the progress reports in the required form or 
within the prescribed time limits. The only data which can 
be considered to be in accordance with the agreements 
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subsequent programmes, the delegation only has access to 
incomplete and contradictory information, which it is 
impossible to compare, let alone check. Carrying out a 
check, for example, implies being able to ascertain the 
quantities shipped, find out the delivery price and assess 
whether the deductions were actually made. The delegation 
can only 'record' the figures which have been brought to its 
attention. 
correct application of the delivery agreements, is entitled to 
expect: 
(a) the volume of resources recorded is, generally speak-
ing, less, and, in many cases, much less, than the 
amount laid down in the agreements; 
3.19. In recent years, the delegation has tried hard to 
improve its information and its control of the use of funds. 
The agreements negotiated with the authorities for the 
1986 programme include new clauses which aim to clarify 
the conditions governing the calculation of the amounts to 
be paid into the funds and to limit the likelihood of 
improper deductions being made. The inclusion of such 
provisions is the first sign of a willingness on the part of the 
Commission to tighten up the conditions set out in delivery 
agreements for all recipient countries. However, this 
attitude is not likely to have any positive effects before 
1988. 
3.20. Of more immediate effect is the presence of a 
representative of the delegation on the interministerial 
committee responsible for implementing proposals for the 
utilization of counterpart funds. The Community is the 
only donor to benefit from such a privilege. This should 
enable it to find out which projects are listed and help it to 
exert a more direct influence on the selection of projects. It 
will also make it easier for the Community to carry out on-
the-spot checks in relation to the execution of the projects 
financed, as it has already done on several occasions. 
4. CONCLUSION 
4.1. From an examination of the counterpart funds, it is 
clear that there are extreme discrepancies between the facts 
observed and what the Court, on the assumption of a 
(b) amounts recognized as due by the recipient states have 
not been paid; 
the low rate of use of some of the resources credited to 
the counterpart funds raises doubts as to the actual 
possibility of implementing development projects or 
programmes in the rural and/or agri-foodstuffs sector. 
4.2. Such a situation is due to a considerable extent, to the 
fact that the text of the delivery agreements is not suited to 
the circumstances. The Commission should re-examine 
certain provisions of these agreements, especially the 
definition of the amounts to be credited and the possibility 
of deducting certain expenses. As soon as the aid is granted, 
it should be possible to agree on the amount to be paid by 
the recipient. The Commission should also define the role 
of its delegations more precisely and encourage them to 
extend the delivery agreements by rules of execution which 
are negotiated locally and suited to local circumstances. 
4.3. However, the reasons for the inadequate functioning 
of the counterpart funds system are perhaps more 
profound. It is extremely difficult to manage such a system 
efficiently. And more especially, in the States in question, 
the situation develops in such a way that it becomes 
impossible to prevent foodstuffs which were initially 
intended to be disposed of in return for due payment from 
in fact being disposed of free of charge or at very low prices. 
The lack of purchasing power, which is often combined 
with a shortage of the foodstuffs themselves, encourages 
increasing recourse to distribution of food free of charge. In 
such situations, the Commission should avoid being faced 
with a fait accompli and should maintain full control of the 
operations. 
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meeting of 26 and 27 
November 1987. 
For the Court of Auditors 
Marcel MART 
President 
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REPLIES OF THE COMMISSION 
Preliminary remarks 1. INTRODUCTION 
The Commission shares some of the concerns of the Court 
as regards the management and operation of counterpart 
funds. Following discussions in a working group con-
stituted last year to study the whole question of the 
management of counterpart funds, the Commission is 
presently in the process of revising the 'general conditions' 
document in order to better define the guidelines for the 
creation and use of counterpart funds. 
The guidelines will reflect the experience gathered by the 
Commission since 1982, when the efforts aimed at the 
integration of food aid into the development process were 
given a new impetus. Since then there has been considerable 
improvement in a significant number of countries on both 
accountability and utilization of counterpart funds; in 
particular the quality of the information provided by 
beneficiary governments has much improved and is now an 
important criterion for renewal of annual food aid 
allocations. 
In general both donors and beneficiary countries now come 
to recognize the economic value of food aid as a transfer of 
resources, as distinct from its value as a supply of 
additional food products. The new guidelines will put this 
development into concrete form as far as the Community's 
food aid is concerned. 
Finally, it should be noted that the approach followed by 
the Commission as regards counterpart funds is similar to 
that of the other major bilateral food aid donors. 
However, the Commission cannot accept the final 
conclusion of the Court's report, namely that lack of 
purchasing power in beneficiary countries tends to lead to 
the free (or very low-priced) distribution of aid intended for 
sale at market price 
The objectives and mechanism of counterpart 
funds 
1.2-1.5. The only reference made in Community 
regulations to the objectives to be attributed to counterpart 
funds is that mentioned in point 1.2 paragraph (b) of the 
report, namely art. 2 paragraph 3 of the old framework 
regulation reproduced in art. 2 paragraph 5 of the new 
regulation. The report correctly states (point 1.4 paragraph 
(c) that the standard text of the general conditions of the 
official letter refers to 'the financing of one or more 
development projects in accordance with the procedures to 
be established between the country of destination and the 
Community'. The report goes on to say that the project or 
projects thus financed should, in accordance with Regu-
lation 3331/82, give priority to the promotion of food 
production in the recipient country. However, it should be 
made clear that the regulation specifies that where aid is 
granted conditionally upon the implementation of'develop-
ment projects (which may be financed from counterpart 
funds) priority shall be given to projects which promote the 
production of food. This is not the same as saying that all 
such projects must have the promotion of food production 
as a priority. Indeed, the only other guideline for the uses to 
which counterpart funds may be put appears in Article 35 
paragraph 1 (b) of the third Lome Convention; in the 
previous Conventions (viz. until 1985) no reference was 
included. In the relevant passage there is some linguistic 
ambiguity between the French and English texts. However 
French being the language in which the text of the 
Convention was drafted, the French text may be taken to 
reflect more accurately the wishes of the contracting 
parties. Article 35 paragraph 1 (b) of the French text reads: 
'b) lorsque les produits fournis au titre de l'aide alimentaire 
sont vendus, ils doivent l'etre a un prix qui ne desorganise 
pas le marche mondial. Les fonds de contrepartie qui en 
resultent sont utilises pour financer la mise en oeuvre et/ou 
le fonctionnement de projets ou de programmes touchant 
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This situation has led to the onus being put on the 
agreements made between the beneficiary country and the 
Community (represented by its delegation) as regards the 
definition of the use to be made of counterpart funds. 
In assessing the objectives to be pursued by counterpart 
funds, those set out for food aid itself have not unnaturally 
been taken into consideration. Indeed the Court itself does 
this in its report (point 1.2.(a)). 
However, there would seem to be no grounds for excluding 
the other two objectives of art. 2 paragraph 1 of the old 
framework regulation, in particular the reference 'to help 
in emergencies'. In point 2.22 of its report the Court 
appears to consider such operations as lying outside the 
scope of counterpart funds. Furthermore the new frame-
work regulation contains two new objectives in Article 2 
paragraph 1 (to promote food security and to support 
efforts by recipient countries to improve their food 
production) as well as a new paragraph 2 stipulating that 
'food aid shall be integrated as thoroughly as possible into 
development policies, and food strategies of the countries 
concerned'. 
It is therefore reasonable to assume that, in so far as it 
considers that the objectives assigned to food aid should 
implicitly be extended to the use of counterpart funds, the 
Court can accept that the new formulation of the 
framework regulation permits a wider use of counterpart 
funds than it has hitherto believed permissible. For example 
the co-financing of units for the coordination of a country's 
food strategy (point 2.22) aims expressly at such objectives. 
2. THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEY BY 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Opening the counterpart account 
2.1 - 2.6. It is true that the ability to accumulate interest 
on deposits and to remain separate from the general budget 
of the beneficiary country makes the opening of an account 
with a financial institution other than the central bank an 
attractive proposition in many cases. The revised text of the 
general conditions (mentioned in the preface above) 
provides for this possibility. 
Financing the counterpart account 
2.7-2.17. The Commission cannot accept there is 'an 
irrepressible tendency' (point 2.11) towards free or low-
priced distribution as a result of lack of purchasing power. 
Where circumstances in a beneficiary country change, 
notably in cases where emergency needs arise, it is only 
prudent that the possibility should exist to permit, by 
common agreement, the free distribution of aid originally 
intended for sale. In the case of Mauritania this agreement 
was given with respect to the transfer of 1983 and 1985 
cereals aid in order to provide relief for drought victims. 
Part of the 1984 cereals allocation intended for sale was 
indeed used for free distribution without the Commission's 
agreement. This coincided with a period of political 
instability culminating in the coup d'etat in December 
1984. Control of counterpart funds in Angola prior to its 
signature of the Lome Convention in 1985 was rendered 
considerably more difficult by the absence of any 
delegation. The'Commission is aware that some 5 400 T of 
the 1984 cereals allocation of 20 000 T were not sold but 
were given, without prior agreement for free distribution to 
refugees from the civil war. 
The Court is correct in asserting that the basis for the 
calculation of counterpart funds, as presently set down in 
the general conditions of the official letter, is inadequately 
defined. No explicit provision is made for the deduction of 
costs (e.g. transport, distribution) from the gross value of 
sales to be allocated to the counterpart fund. Moreover the 
sale price itself is sometimes hard to specify precisely and is 
frequently an administered/subsidized price set by the 
government. 
This situation led the Commission when revising the 
general conditions of the official letter to much the same 
conclusions as those of the Court. It seems logical that the 
general principle should be to credit the counterpart fund 
with the economic value of the gift made, viz. the actual 
f.o.b., c.i.f. or f.a.d. price (depending upon the terms of the 
allocation) which represents the saving made to the 
beneficiary country's balance of payments. This approach 
has the merit of clarity and is widely shared by other 
donors. 
The Court appears to accept (point 2.17) the principle that 
the price retained for the purposes of calculating the sum to 
be credited to the counterpart fund may indeed be different 
from the actual sale price (although it should be noted in 
passing that the former cannot of itself disturb local 
production). This is consistent with the Commission's 
thinking, namely that the former should reflect the value of 
the allocation made whereas the latter is principally a 
question of the beneficiary government's food policy. 4. 2. 88  Official Journal of the European Communities  No C 31/29 
It can be agreed that customs duties should not be levied on 
the suppliers of Community food aid (point 2.15a) since 
this leads to allowance for import duties simply being 
included in the tenders and so passed on to the Community. 
It is clear, however, that where domestic prices are higher 
than world prices, the beneficiary government may require 
duty to be paid by the agency in receipt of the aid in order 
that local prices should not be disturbed. In the same way 
that countries with low price food policies are required to 
bear the cost of subsidization through the sum transferred 
to the counterpart fund, so it is only reasonable that 
countries with high price food policies should normally be 
allowed to retain taxes and duties received as a result of this 
policy as a budgetary resource. 
The use of counterpart funds 
2.18 - 2.24. The system of dual signature for counterpart 
fund accounts (points 2.18 and 2.19) indeed has strengths 
and weaknesses. In addition to the points made in the 
report there is the further advantage that the use of a dual 
signature enables the management and control of counter-
part funds to be aligned more closely with those of EDF 
funds. 
For the reasons developed in the introduction (see above) 
the Commission insists that the use of counterpart funds to 
meet the distribution costs of emergency aid allocations, or 
to co-finance food policy units and intervention agencies 
(points 2.21-2.23) is entirely consistent with the objectives 
set down in Community regulations. However, it agrees 
with the Court that great care must be taken to ensure that 
operational problems, as in, for example, cases where the 
replenishment of working capital has been neglected, do 
not occur 
Monitoring of counterpart funds 
2.25 - 2.26. The Commission shares the positions of the 
Court and instructions of the sort mentioned have already 
been drafted for transmission with the revised official 
letter. 
3. EXAMINATION OF COUNTERPART 
ACCOUNTS IN NIGER, BURKINA FASO AND 
EGYPT 
Niger 
Financing the counterpart account 
3.2 - 3.5. Regarding the assertion that 'the OPFN 
acknowledges that it still has to pay into the account an 
amount totalling 780 Mio CFA.F (approximately 2,3 Mio 
ECU)', that sum has been added to the OPFN's capital. The 
move represents an initial step in the restructuring of the 
OPFN, involving the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation 
Economique (CCE), which was put in hand in 1985. The 
full restructuring plan has now been drawn up and awaits 
the decision of the Niger Government, which should be 
forthcoming by the end of the year. 
Burkina Faso 
Opening the counterpart account 
3.8. The first food aid counterpart funds account, with 
the Treasury, had a balance of 130 196 750 CFA.F, which 
was used for repair of the tracks between Aribinda, 
Gorom-Gorom and Dori; the repairs cost a total of 
162 041 680 CFA.F. 
The food aid counterpart account with the Treasury (a/c 
CET 30 157) is therefore closed. 
3.9-3.10. Separate accounts have been kept for all 
operations using the IBTIA food aid counterpart funds 
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Moneys not needed in the short term are placed in a term 
account, in accordance with the principles of sound 
financial management. 
The use of counterpart funds 
3.12 - 3.13. Support for NACFCER to help it to channel 
cereals from areas in surplus to towns and deficit areas is in 
line with the organization's raison d'etre. The Commission 
considers the mobilization of local resources to be 
preferable to the distribution of imported aid. 
A decision has already been taken to allocate the balance of 
the counterpart fund account to a rice cultivation project. 
Studies are well advanced and the project should get under 
way shortly. The use of this money to finance purchase 
operations is a way of mobilizing local resources and 
avoiding unnecessary imports. The balance of the counter-
part funds can be used for the Comoe rice growing project, 
currently at the study stage. 
Egypt 
3.15. At the urging of the Commission Delegation in 
Cairo the Egyptian authorities have finally agreed from this 
year onwards to pay counterpart funds, within six months 
of receipt of the aid, into a special account in the name of 
the Ministry of Agriculture. The account requires two 
signatures, one of them that of the head of the Delegation. 
The Delegation will also be represented on the committee 
which is to decide how the money will be used, referred to 
by the Court at 3.21. 
3.16. The Egyptian authorities have accepted the new, 
stricter conditions for food aid under the 1987 programme. 
One of these conditions is that between now and 1990 the 
basis on which counterpart funds are calculated will 
gradually be aligned on the world market price of the 
products supplied. 
3.17. Although the Egyptian authorities have not pro-
vided details, some agricultural projects have nevertheless 
been financed using counterpart funds. In accounting terms 
the drawings from the special account may look like mere 
book entries transferred between the budget headings for 
various Egyptian ministries, but we feel it is important that 
the increase in budget appropriations has enabled projects 
to be financed which contribute to the development of 
Egyptian agriculture. Obviously, things are different with 
operations or projects financed under the financial 
protocol, when administration of the funds can be directly 
supervised by the Commission. 
3.19. The Commission hopes that the new procedures 
worked out with the Egyptian authorities, cutting the 
financed ministry out of the banking arrangements and 
specifying a dual signature for the special account, will 
allow more rapid use and better monitoring of the 
counterpart funds and satisfactory implementation of the 
development projects or programmes financed by them. 
The Commission and the delegations will in particular 
spare no effort to improve the operation of counterpart 
funds deriving from aid granted in more recent years. 